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FOREWORD
GOVERNOR RICHARD W. RILEY*
When the South Carolina General Assembly passed, in
1967, The Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act, South
Carolina became an "Agreement State" under the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission's agreement state program. Simply put, this
allowed South Carolina to assume direct responsibility for and
control of the licensing and permitting of radioactive material
use in the state. State responsibility does not include, however,
operations of the federal government such as the Savannah
River Plant. Nor does it include the on-site operations of nu-
clear power plants-South Carolina has four reactors in opera-
tion now, one almost ready to begin operation, and four more
under construction.
In 1969, a licensing application was received for the creation
of a low-level nuclear waste burial facility. It took two years of
scrutiny and further study before the license was granted in
1971. In retrospect, it was that two years of careful consideration
of the data supporting the license application that has led South
Carolina to have a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility
that has not required closure because of operational problems
such as other states have experienced.
Shortly after I took office in January of 1979, it was brought
to my attention that what had been created in 1971 as a regional
facility-one of six low-level radioactive waste burial sites in the
United States-was fast on its way to becoming one of only two,
or maybe the only one in the entire country. More than three
million cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste was disposed of
in commercial burial grounds in the United States in 1978. Be-
cause of the proximity of the South Carolina site to the majority
of generators of such waste across the country, nearly eighty per-
cent of it came to South Carolina for disposal. Shipments con-
sistently were arriving at the site that did not comply with ap-
plicable laws or regulations. Many discrepancies involved
radiation readings in excess of allowable limits. The states of ori-
gin of the wastes were asuming little, if any, responsibility for
the packaging or transportation methods practiced by waste
generators. I asked our Department of Health and Environmen-
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tal Control to begin inspecting every shipment of the waste
when it arrived at the burial site.
In six months of intensive inspection, not only did we sub-
stantiate that shipments were being made improperly, but that
our reports of the discrepancies were not being dealt with appro-
priately by federal authorities. I joined the governors of the
states where two other sites are located, Governor Dixie Lee Ray
of Washington and Governor Robert List of Nevada, in calling
for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation to do their job by enforcing federal reg-
ulations and sanctioning violators. A regulatory process that is
not enforced is nothing more than sham; that is what existed in
the summer of 1979. We turned to state law to sanction the vio-
lators and found that no civil penalties were provided. The ex-
tent to which we could show, however, that a violation, or its
repeated occurrence, constituted a threat to the public health,
we were able to issue orders prohibiting further shipments from
that generator until such time as they were able to demonstrate
clearly that disregard for law and regulation would not reoccur.
Federal authorities have since demonstrated more effective
enforcement of laws and regulations. Also, by the end of the
1980 legislative session, South Carolina had passed amendments
to the South Carolina Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act
providing authority for civil penalties to punish those who do
not ship waste in our state exactly by the letter of the law. In
addition, every state was notified that we are reducing the
amount of low-level waste allowed into our site each year. We
were receiving as much as 250,000 cubic feet a month in
1979-enabling the other two sites to close and causing the
South Carolina site to become, through attrition, the national
disposal facility for low-level nuclear waste. In October 1979,
South Carolina instituted a license condition that established
volume limits on the amount of wastes that could be accepted at
the facility near Barnwell. By late 1981, no more than 100,000
cubic feet per month will be allowed.
Continued monitoring, reduced volume, sanction of viola-
tors, prohibiting access to our disposal site by those who repeat-
edly violate law and regulation-those were the things we could
do as a state to assure our citizens, with confidence, that contin-
ued operation of the site is proper. What remains to be done is
to get other states to accept responsibility for the low-level radi-
oactive wastes generated within their borders and to secure the
creation of new disposal sites located regionally across the
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country.
I have advocated since my first days in office that Congress
take action to mandate that individual states are responsible for
the management and disposal of low-level nuclear waste gener-
ated within their borders. This proposal removes the remaining
barrier to the creation of new disposal sites-the perception by
most states that this is a federal responsibility and that the fed-
eral government would take their wastes to new federal sites or
existing federal sites now used almost exclusively for wastes
from federal research and defense activities. In addition to as-
signing this responsibiity to the states, it was necessary that
states be authorized to enter into interstate compacts for man-
aging such wastes and that the compacts have the right to ex-
clude low-level nuclear wastes generated outside those states
comprising the compact. This authority would be the real impe-
tus for the development of new disposal capacity by allowing re-
gions with sites to determine from whom receipt of wastes would
be allowed. It is clear that when the management and disposal
becomes a state responsibility, rather than that of the federal
government, states must either create their own sites or join
with other states to do so.
With the help of many Congressmen and Senators, most no-
tably, South Carolina Representative Butler Derrick, Congress
passed such legislation in the final hours of the last session,
which was signed into law by President Carter. Within the Low-
Level Waste Policy Act of 1980, Congress created the framework
under which all states must assume their proper responsibility
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
As soon as I became involved in the matter of low-level nu-
clear waste, I was visited by federal officials who wanted to dis-
cuss the idea of South Carolina having another type of nuclear
waste facility that would serve as a storage site for spent nuclear
power reactor fuel. My response was, and has consistently been,
that I was opposed to the idea of the federal government provid-
ing away-from-reactor (AFR) storage without a demonstrated
commitment to the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive
wastes. Even then, consideration of an AFR must be on a lim-
ited basis and according to a regional system.
A basic law of political-physics, which is often overlooked in
nuclear waste considerations, says that waste stays where it is
first put. What may be intended to be temporary interim stor-
age could, without a demonstrated commitment to permanent
disposal of high-level wastes, become de facto permanent stor-
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age. One just need look at the more than 23 million gallons of
high-level radioactive wastes that have been accumulating in
temporary storage at the Savannah River Plant for almost three
decades.
What we are attempting to do in South Carolina is to con-
tend with the entry of the political process into nuclear waste
decisionmaking. Heretofore, such decisions were the sole pur-
view of those trained in the science of nuclear waste disposal
and our faith in them was absolute. Such absolute faith has,
however, been shaken and our attitudes toward such decision-
making have been drastically transformed.
Because of this transformation, we have gone beyond the
question of "what will we do with this waste?" to "who will de-
cide what will be done?" and "how will they decide?" There are
those who still say that public officials, like governors and state
legislators, don't understand and, therefore, cannot resolve is-
sues involving complex questions of nuclear physics and that the
keystone to our democracy, the voter, simply cannot grasp many
of the facts having a bearing on this question. They contend that
decisions about "what to do" should remain solely in the com-
munity of those who do understand. This simply cannot be. The
public is aware and is concerned. It may be that, on occasion,
their reactions are not equal to the risks. But the public's con-
cerns are real nonetheless! And without a serious effort to re-
build public confidence, our ability to manage these wastes will
be seriously threatened.
It has been said that we were lulled into a false sense of
security regarding nuclear waste, its storage and disposal. The
manner in which past decisions were made simply did not pro-
vide the opportunity for adequate critical assessments that
might have encouraged new knowledge and technology to solve
the very questions facing us today.
Thus, if the questions are truly "who will decide what will
be done?" and "how will they decide?," those of us who are in-
volved in these decisions must insure that the demands of the
political process are balanced with and informed by the appro-
priate scientific expertise. Within such a scientific/political de-
bate, all parties must be prepared to substantiate the basis for
their recommendations. It will be this substantiation alone,
presented in a climate of openness, scrutiny, and criticism, that
will provide the confidence so necessary for intelligent nuclear
waste management decisions. Of highest importance today is not
only what is to be done, but also how we decide it is to be done.
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A process of decisionmaking must be established that will allow
us to have confidence in the results of that process. There will be
remaining uncertainties no matter what the decisions are. Only
confidence in the process that leads to those decisions will en-
able us, as a society, to live with the remaining uncertainties.
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